Smith examines the doctrine that reason is the original principle of approbation. Hobbes had made civil obedience the measure of right; opponents replied that the mind must possess antecedent notions of right and wrong, and that reason distinguishes moral fit from unfit as it distinguishes truth from falsehood. Cudworth showed that law itself presupposes the ideas it is said to create.
Smith grants that reason is the source of general moral maxims. We observe what pleases or displeases our moral faculties, inductively form rules, and regulate judgment by them when immediate feeling would be variable. In this sense virtue may be said to consist in conformity to reason. Yet it is absurd to suppose that first perceptions of right and wrong in particular cases arise from reason. Whatever is agreeable or disagreeable for its own sake must be so to immediate sense and feeling; reason can show means to ends, not render an object intrinsically pleasing.
If virtue necessarily pleases and vice displeases for its own sake, the original distinction belongs to sentiment, not to deduction. Dr. Hutcheson first separated with precision what in moral judgment belongs to reason and what to immediate feeling; Smith endorses that division. The determination of this second question, he adds, is of great speculative but little practical importance: how approbation arises does not alter what, in particular cases, we ought to approve.
Smith wrote this during a time when kings claimed divine right to rule and define morality. Today, we face the same pattern with different players: corporations claiming their profit motives serve the greater good, politicians insisting harmful policies are necessary, managers saying toxic workplace cultures are 'just business.' The mechanism remains identical—external authority trying to override your internal moral sense. Smith's insight cuts through centuries of confusion: your immediate emotional response to cruelty, unfairness, or manipulation isn't a bug in your system, it's a feature. When your stomach turns at a supervisor taking credit for your work, when your heart sinks at seeing a colleague bullied, when something feels 'off' about a policy change—that's data, not drama. The danger comes when we're trained to dismiss these responses as 'unprofessional' or 'too emotional.' Authority figures benefit when you doubt your moral instincts. They can logic you into accepting what your gut knows is wrong. Smith argues that reason should serve your moral sense, not replace it. Use logic to understand why something feels wrong and how to respond, but start with trusting the feeling itself.
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