Montaigne starts from a liberty of speech that lets critics talk after the war is already over. They blame the leaders at Moncontour for not pushing the victory home, and they blame the King of Spain at St Quentin for not using the advantage he had. A soul already drunk with success, they say, loses the appetite to add more. War is not fencing: so long as the enemy is on foot, the game begins again, and that is not to be called a victory that puts not an end to the war. Caesar, worsted near Oricum, told Pompey's soldiers he would have been lost if their general had known how to overcome.
The same facts arm the opposite case. To chase after a victory is to throw yourself back on fortune and to drive an enemy to despair. Sylla and Marius will not stand a desperate reserve. Monsieur de Foix ruins the glory of Ravenna by pursuing the remains and dies; Monsieur d'Anguien remembers that lesson at Serisoles. Pharax withholds the King of Lacedaemon from charging a thousand escaped Argians; Clodomir forces Gondemar to turn and loses his life. Rich armour can inflame courage, yet Lycurgus forbids spoils and Hannibal tells Antiochus the Romans will be satisfied with so much booty. Vitellius insults Otho's city-softened troops and, instead of cowing them, makes them fight as their own captains could not. Pyrrhus hides in Megacles' armour and saves his life while nearly losing the battle. Pompey stands still at Pharsalia and, Plutarch says, cools the charge; had Caesar come by the worse, another voice would have praised that planted firmness.
King Francis, facing Charles V in Provence, weighs whether to meet him in Italy or wait at home. Invasion ruins the country you defend, and pillage by your own side breeds sedition; yet at home the rivers and passes are yours, and the invader can founder on disease and unknown roads. Francis recalls his forces. Scipio prospers by attacking Africa; Hannibal ruins himself by coming home; Athens fails in Sicily; Agathocles is favoured in Africa. Events, especially in war, will not submit to human prudence. Timaeus in Plato closes the essay: we argue rashly because our discourses have great participation in the temerity of chance.
Montaigne lived through France's religious wars, where Catholics and Protestants slaughtered each other while both claiming to follow Christ's teachings of love. He noticed something crucial: the same evidence could support opposite conclusions depending on what you valued most. Today, we see this everywhere. Two nurses can look at the same patient data and disagree about discharge timing—one prioritising bed availability and cost control, the other focusing on patient safety and recovery time. Both use legitimate medical reasoning, but they're weighing different values. This isn't relativism or 'both sides are equal.' Some positions are better supported by evidence. But recognising competing valid perspectives prevents us from dismissing opponents as stupid or evil. When your coworker argues for different break schedules, they might be addressing real concerns about coverage or fairness that you haven't considered. When neighbours split on school funding, both sides usually want good education—they just disagree about methods and priorities. The pattern repeats because complex situations contain multiple variables we can't perfectly predict or control. Understanding this doesn't make us wishy-washy; it makes us better at finding solutions that work for real people with different needs.
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