The French campaign after Moscow, Tolstoy says, was a flight in which the crowd destroyed itself. From the turn onto the Kaluga road to the day their leader fled the army, none of the movements of that crowd had any sense. One might have expected historians, who blame the mass on one man's will, to find this stretch impossible to fit their theory. Instead mountains of books still describe Napoleon's arrangements, maneuvers, profound plans, and the genius of his marshals.
The retreat from Malo-Yaroslavets, when a free road into a well-supplied district lay open, is explained as deep calculation. So is the retreat from Smolensk to Orsha. Krasnoe is told as heroism: Napoleon walked with a birch stick and said he had played emperor long enough and would now act general, then ran away again and left scattered fragments of army behind. Ney's greatness of soul, in these books, consists in slipping by night through forest and across the Dnieper to Orsha, abandoning standards, artillery, and nine tenths of his men. Napoleon's last departure in a warm fur coat, leaving to perish men he had brought there, is presented as characteristic of genius. When elastic reasoning cannot stretch farther, historians produce greatness, a category that sits outside right and wrong. For the great man, they say, nothing is an atrocity.
Tolstoy answers with a measure he will not drop. With the standard of good and evil given by Christ, no human action is beyond comparison, and there is no greatness where simplicity, goodness, and truth are absent. To admit a greatness not commensurate with right and wrong is, he says, only to admit one's own meanness. The world has repeated Sublime and Grand for fifty years. The same acts look like genius in libraries and like shame in ordinary speech, and those two languages still sit side by side.
Tolstoy exposes something uncomfortable: we're often complicit in the lies power tells about itself because admitting leadership failure means admitting we were fooled. When Napoleon abandoned his freezing soldiers to save himself, later historians couldn't just call it cowardice, that would mean the 'great man' they'd built their worldview around was actually a selfish coward. So they invented elaborate explanations about strategic necessity and complex military thinking. The alternative was too threatening to their entire understanding of how the world works. We do this constantly today because we desperately need authority figures to be competent. When a hospital administrator cuts nursing staff and patients suffer, we want to believe it was a 'difficult but necessary decision' rather than face the reality that someone prioritized profit over lives. When a manager creates a toxic workplace, we call them 'demanding' rather than admit they're just cruel. When politicians abandon constituents during crises, we talk about 'political realities' instead of acknowledging betrayal. This isn't just about protecting powerful people, it's about protecting our own psychological comfort. Admitting that those in charge are often incompetent, selfish, or cowardly means admitting that the world is more chaotic and dangerous than we want to believe. But Tolstoy argues that real safety comes from seeing clearly, not from maintaining comfortable illusions. When we stop needing our leaders to be heroes, we can finally hold them accountable for being decent human beings.
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