Smith pauses before the licentious systems to acknowledge what the respectable theories teach. All suppose a real distinction between vice and virtue and generally encourage the praise-worthy disposition. Each system tilts the balance: propriety exalts fortitude and self-command while slighting gentle humanity; benevolence fosters mild virtues yet denies full virtue to prudent self-care; prudence elevates caution while stripping grandeur from the amiable and the awful alike. Yet society would gain if men followed any one of them; even Epicurus shows how virtue secures outward safety as well as inward peace, which is why Cicero, Seneca, and opposing schools quoted him with approval.
Against these stand Rochefoucauld and Mandeville, who would abolish the distinction altogether. Mandeville treats every action prompted by regard to praise as vanity and public spirit as flattery bred upon pride. Smith distinguishes three desires: to become honourable, to acquire esteem by deserving it, and frivolous hunger for applause at any price. Only the last is vanity. Love of true glory resembles love of virtue in aiming at what ought to be esteemed; the man of magnanimity values the opinion that ought to be entertained of him even when mankind err, and regards false censure as directed at a mistaken character, like indignation vented at a friend in masquerade.
Mandeville's greater fallacy is to treat every passion that admits of excess as wholly vicious, then conclude private vices are public benefits because luxury supports refinement. Ascetic doctrines demanding extirpation of affection made his reductio plausible; temperance and chastity require not insensibility but restraint that avoids harm to self and offence to society. His ambiguity exploits names that mark offensive degree rather than moderated passion. Moral philosophy cannot deceive grossly: accounts of domestic affection must preserve some truth, as when a traveller describes our own parish. Smith turns to the principle of approbation, classifying theories from self-love, reason, or sentiment, and noting that the speculative answer alters practice less than disputes over virtue's nature. Licentious systems gained plausibility only because they bordered on truths about vanity and mixed motive that sound morality must acknowledge without surrendering the distinction between vice and virtue.
Why do cynical explanations feel so smart? Smith identified something crucial: there's intellectual satisfaction in claiming you see through everyone's noble pretenses to the 'real' selfish motives underneath. It makes you feel worldly and sophisticated. But Smith warns this sophistication comes at a cost. When we decide that the CNA who comforts dying patients is 'really' just seeking approval, and the drug dealer who pushes pills to kids is also 'really' just seeking approval, we've erased a distinction that matters enormously. Yes, both might want recognition. But one deserves it and one doesn't. The cynical view feels clever because it contains a grain of truth—people do have mixed motives. But it uses that grain of truth to justify abandoning the hard work of making moral distinctions. In our social media age, cynical takes get more engagement than nuanced ones. 'Everyone's corrupt' gets more likes than 'this person made a mistake but is trying to do better.' This creates a feedback loop where cynicism becomes the default mode. Smith shows us that real wisdom isn't about seeing through everyone's motives—it's about maintaining standards while acknowledging that human beings are complicated. The goal isn't pure motives; it's better choices despite mixed motives.
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