Expanding a new domain looks like victory, but Machiavelli calls mixed principalities the trap that breaks new rulers. People welcome change hoping life will improve, then rebel when it does not; often they discover they have gone from bad to worse. You inherit double hostility: enemies among those you injured taking power, and disappointed allies you cannot punish because you owe them. Even with a strong army, you still need the goodwill of the people you now rule.
Louis XII shows how fast it can collapse. He seized Milan quickly and lost it just as fast when the men who opened the gates turned on him after the new prince's burdens. Take a rebellious province a second time, Machiavelli adds, and you can use the rebellion to purge suspects and fortify weak points; the first loss required only Lodovico's border revolt, the second required the whole world. Holding annexed territory depends on similarity: same country and language makes integration easier if you eliminate the old ruling family and leave laws and taxes alone, as France did with Brittany and Normandy. Different customs demand residence on the ground, colonies instead of expensive garrisons, and a blunt rule: injure men seriously enough that they cannot revenge themselves, or do not injure them lightly at all.
The Romans in Greece kept minor allies friendly, humbled major ones, and never let a foreign equal gain a foothold; they treated troubles like a fever, easy to cure when small and fatal when ignored. Louis did the opposite. After the Venetians brought him into Italy, he helped Pope Alexander seize the Romagna, shared Naples with Spain, refused to live in the country, sent no colonies, destroyed minor powers while strengthening greater ones, and later turned on the Venetians when he needed them as a buffer. Machiavelli lists those failures clearly, then closes with the line he gave Cardinal Rouen at Nantes: the French did not understand statecraft, and he who makes another powerful is usually ruined in the process.
Mixed principalities fail for a psychological reason before they fail for a military one. People invite change because they expect improvement, then rebel when the new prince burdens them or disappoints their hopes. You start with enemies you injured and allies you cannot satisfy.
Machiavelli then turns practical. Similar territories can merge if you remove the old ruling family and keep laws and taxes stable. Different territories require presence, colonies instead of costly garrisons, and a hard choice about injury: small wounds create vengeance, serious ones remove the threat. The Roman example adds statecraft: protect weak neighbours, restrain strong ones, keep foreign equals out, and treat trouble while it is still small.
Louis XII is the negative proof. He entered Italy through Venetian ambition, then strengthened the Church, divided Naples with Spain, refused to reside, sent no colonies, and mishandled the Venetians once he needed them as a buffer. Machiavelli's closing rule follows naturally: he who makes another powerful is ruined. In modern campaigns or mergers, the leader who elevates a rival vendor, faction, or ally to win a short-term gain is repeating Louis's error.
In modern terms: The people who helped you gain new power will become your first enemies when expectations are not met
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