Machiavelli turns from mercenaries to auxiliaries, the allied troops a prince calls in for aid. They may be good in themselves, but for the prince who borrows them they are always disadvantageous: if you lose, you are undone; if you win, you are their captive.
Pope Julius II learned this when, after Ferrara exposed the weakness of his mercenaries, he threw himself into Ferdinand of Spain's arms. Fortune alone saved him from the usual result: his auxiliaries were routed at Ravenna, then the Swiss drove out the conquerors, so he became prisoner to neither enemy nor ally. The Florentines, unarmed, sent ten thousand Frenchmen against Pisa and ran greater danger than in their other troubles. The Emperor of Constantinople sent ten thousand Turks into Greece, who refused to leave when the war ended, beginning Greece's servitude to infidels.
Auxiliaries are more hazardous than mercenaries because they are united and obey a foreign master. With mercenaries, cowardice is the danger; with auxiliaries, valour is, because they can win and then own you. The wise prince avoids both and would rather lose with his own arms than conquer with another's.
Cesare Borgia shows the progression: French auxiliaries took Imola and Forli, then Orsini and Vitelli mercenaries, then his own men, on whose fidelity his reputation kept rising. Hiero of Syracuse slaughtered useless condottieri and fought with native forces. David rejected Saul's armor because another man's arms fall off, weigh you down, or bind you.
Charles VII built France's own infantry and men-at-arms; Louis XI destroyed the infantry and leaned on the Swiss, leaving France mixed, stronger than mercenaries or auxiliaries alone but far weaker than own forces. Machiavelli closes where Rome began to fall by enlisting the Goths: no principality is secure without forces of its own composed of subjects, citizens, or dependents.
Chapter 13 completes Machiavelli's attack on borrowed military power by turning to auxiliaries, the allied armies a prince imports for help. The opening verdict is sharper than the mercenary chapter because auxiliaries can actually fight. That is exactly the problem. Lose with them and you are ruined; win with them and you belong to their master.
The middle stacks recent proof. Julius II at Ferrara and Ravenna shows the trap and the rare escape through fortune. Florence's French expedition against Pisa and Constantinople's Turkish auxiliaries show the more common endings: danger or permanent servitude. Machiavelli then contrasts mercenary cowardice with auxiliary valour and insists a wise prince would rather lose with his own arms than win with foreign ones.
Borgia supplies the constructive arc: French auxiliaries, then mercenaries, then native soldiers, with reputation rising only at the last stage. Hiero, David, Charles VII, Louis XI, and the Goths in Rome extend the lesson across eras. Mixed or borrowed forces may look strong at first, like a hidden fever, but power not founded on subjects, citizens, or dependents remains unstable by definition.
In modern terms: Auxiliary arms can win wars for their true master, not for you; only forces composed of your own subjects, citizens, or dependents make power secure in adversity
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